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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Options for a  
European  
Recovery Fund
On April 23, 2020, the European Coun-
cil mandated the European Commis-
sion to work on a European Recovery 
Fund and to clarify its possible link 
with the Multiannual Financial Frame-
work (MFF), the EU’s long-term bud-
get. Negotiations on the MFF for the 
period 2021-2027 were at an advanced 
state when the coronavirus-induced 
economic crisis hit the EU. Like so 
much else, the EU budget now needs 
to be adapted to meet new challenges 
in the wake of the health crisis. 
In all likelihood, the European Com-
mission will first issue a communi-
cation around May 14, 2020. It may 
suggest that the negotiations and leg-
islative procedure surrounding the 
creation of a European Recovery Fund 
be fully embedded into the MFF and 
continue in that framework. The up-
side of doing this is that the recovery 
fund would be based in existing insti-
tutions and processes; the danger is 
that this would drag the process out 
and make the European Recovery Fund 
subject to endless bargaining. 
The current debate about the EU’s 
economic recovery from the pandemic 
is characterized by a strong polariza-
tion around single issues, the most 
prominent being the question of joint-
ly issued bonds on the funding side. 
On the expenditure side, the most di-
visive issue is the question of the rel-
ative amount of grants vs. loans. Both 
the size of the common borrowing as 
well as the amount of grants are cen-
tral to the effectiveness of this future 
European Recovery Fund and should 
not be considered as a trade-off.
In order for the preparation of the 
MFF and the recovery fund to move 
forward in a productive way, EU de-
cision-makers will have to carry out 
a sober assessment of the legal and 
technical options for raising the nec-
essary funds and the respective pros 
and cons of different funding sourc-
es. It is important to note that the 
way the funds are used will be even 
more important than the way they are 
raised.  This note focuses first on ways 
and means to raise a sizeable recovery 
fund and then describes succinctly the 
limitations that the selection of cer-
tain funding sources would impose on 
recovery fund spending.  
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Oppenheim Center for  
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WITHIN OR OUTSIDE  
THE MFF
There are several important choices for 
the EU to make. The first is whether it 
wants to create the recovery fund with-
in the EU budget or outside of it. Some 
governments see advantages in linking 
the MFF and the recovery fund close-
ly—they believe this would allow them 
to gain leverage in the struggle to re-
form the EU’s most expensive expendi-
ture policies, in particular the Common 
Agricultural Policy and Structural and 
Cohesion Policy, and negotiate a pack-
age deal. Also, this would allow existing 
funding tools of the MFF to be used.
But placing the recovery fund outside of 
the EU budget would provide far more 
flexibility and would certainly make it 
easier to negotiate. It would also allow 
a sub-group of Member States to pro-
ceed with it in the absence of unani-
mous agreement, which is required for 
agreements on the MFF. The EU urgent-
ly needs to agree to  European Recovery 
Fund that would ensure a meanfing-
ful macroeconomic response, so even if 
the European Commission were to pro-
pose a close link between if not full inte-
gration in the MFF, a decoupling might 
eventually occur for the sake of expe-
diency, in particular if the MFF negotia-
tions end up in another deadlock.
Integrating the fund into the MFF
If the choice is made to proceed with a 
close link or integration of the recov-
ery fund and the EU budget, the EU 
will have to solve fundamental ques-
tions that touch on the political nature 
of the EU budget and, more fundamen-
tally, of the European Union. 
• A first, seemingly technical question 
is whether the EU should only increase 
its annual resources ceiling temporar-
ily in order to respond to the crisis via 
the use of “exceptional circumstanc-
es” (Art. 17 of the MFF regulation), or 
whether it should change the own re-
sources ceiling set in the Own Re-
sources Decision, which in any case 
needs to be renewed for the period of 
the new Multiannual Financial Frame-
work (2021-2027). Taking the latter op-
tion would imply that the European 
Council would have to raise the own 
resources ceiling, which was main-
tained at 1.23 percent of all the Mem-
ber States’ gross national income (GNI) 
for the two budgetary periods 2007-
2013 and 2014-2020. 
• Once there is an agreement to raise 
the own resources ceiling, the central 
question will be how to fund the in-
crease. Currently, there are three cat-
egories of own resources: traditional 
own resources based on customs du-
ties and until 2017 on levies on sugar 
production, the own resource based on 
value added tax (VAT), and the own re-
source based on gross national income 
(GNI). Other revenue sources include 
taxes paid by officials, fines imposed 
on firms by the Union, and interest on 
late payments. The key question now 
is whether the EU should fund the in-
crease by getting higher contributions 
from Member States, according to the 
existing logic. An alternative would be 
to overcome the confederal nature of 
the EU budget, i.e. to ensure true, fed-
eral own resources in the form of VAT, 
corporate tax, plastic tax, or a levy on 
the EU emissions trading scheme. This 
is a rather fundamental question about 
the long-term future of the EU budget.
• It is thirdly necessary to ascertain the 
extent to which the EU is prepared to 
allow the EU budget to go into defi-
cit. Formally speaking, as per Article 
310 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), all reve-
nues and expenditures of the EU must 
appear in the budget and the budget 
must be balanced. But Article 311 stip-
ulates that “the Union shall provide 
itself with the means necessary to at-
tain its objectives and carry through its 
policies.” It would be an important de-
parture to agree that, in response to 
the crisis and as a means to deliver ap-
propriate, sizeable, and timely solidar-
ity, EU borrowing would count as EU 
revenues, thereby formally opening 
the way for the EU to run budget defi-
cits. This would allow the EU to effec-
tively spread the cost of the crisis over 
a longer time and would make the MFF 
a real budget with borrowing power, 
rather than a simple piggy bank.
• These discussions, however, cannot 
be disconnected from those on the the 
liability incurred by the Member States 
in the process. The recent introduction 
of the SURE framework shows that the 
EU has been unable to consider lift-
ing considerably the borrowing power 
of the EU with own resources and vol-
untary government guarantees to en-
sure the highest possible rating for the 
EU. An alternative to this model is the 
European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF): the great benefit of endowing a 
vehicle like the EFSF,  governed by the 
EU, is that it has autonomous decision 
making and therefore the guarantees 
made to it do not count as public debt, 
unlike for example the paid-in capital 
to the ESM. Major points of conten-
tion here will be the size of the guar-
antees, and whether they are joint and 
several (each Member State is liable for 
the whole debt) or simply several (each 
Member State is only liable for each 
quota share), and finally how they are 
calculated. The EU BUDG directorate 
has so far had a very conservative ap-
proach to financial management. But 
the EU could certainly raise more debt 
without endangering its credit rating 
if it stopped limiting itself to borrow-
ing no more than a maximum of the 
gap between the resources ceiling and 
actual expenditure, which implies that 
the EU should be able to pay back its 
entire debt stock over the seven year 
period of the MFF.
The maturity date of the borrowing 
will be important too. One option that 
deserves further exploration is the 
issuance of perpetual debt. The length 
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of the borrowing would be important 
to minimize the annual debt service 
of this borrowing. The longer the bor-
rowing, the smaller the debt service. 
In the case of perpetual bonds, there 
is no reimbursement of the principal 
and therefore the debt service cost is 
as low as possible. Positive examples 
for the use of perpetual bonds exist in 
post-war Britain as well as in the US. 
Some argue that under the use of 122 
TFEU, which is meant to be for tem-
porary emergencies, it would be diffi-
cult to justify perpetual borrowing. But 
by this logic one could also argue that 
long-term borrowing of any sort would 
not be applicable to finance emergen-
cies, which has not been the case be-
fore (see table 1). 
Legal Basis 
in the TFEU
Purpose Scope Link to MFF Use of 
funds
Art. 222 Emergency response to 
man-made or natural ca-
tastrophe. Catastro-
phes are considered to 
be large scale if the esti-
mated direct cost of dam-
age exceeds 3 billion euro 
or 0.6% of gross nation-
al income of the country 
concerned.
A Solidarity Fund is already in place and 
has been used in response to natural  
disasters or terrorist attack. As part  
of the EU coordinated package respond- 
ing to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
scope of the EU Solidarity Fund was  
extended by a modifying regulation ad-
opted on 30 March 2020.  The amend-
ment includes public health crises within 
the scope of the EUSF, to allow its mo-
bilization, if needed, for the hardest hit 
Member States.  
The financial resources neces-
sary for the implementation of 
the Solidarity Clause should 
stay within the agreed annual 
expenditure limits and in accor-
dance with the existing Union 
instruments and their finan-
cial ceilings (Art. 10 Decision 
2014/415/EU). 
The funds 
are used 
as grants
Art. 122 Extraordinary measures 
under “exceptional occur-
rences”. Art. 122.1 allows 
the EU to take measures 
appropriate to the eco-
nomic situation “in the 
spirit of solidarity”, 
Art. 122.2 allows for ad 
hoc financial assistance 
to one or more member 
states.
The following conditions: 
a) the Member State should be in  
difficulties or should be seriously  
threatened with severe difficulties, 
b) these difficulties should be caused  
by natural disasters or exceptional  
occurrences and, 
c) these causes must be beyond the  
control of the Member State. 
The financial assistance can be 
provided either via the EU bud-
get—in which case, the instru-
ment’s size would be limited by 
the expenditure ceiling—or by 
the total borrowing available 
under the own resources ceiling 
for payment appropriations. 
The alternative is to set up a 
new SPV, which could raise debt 
with bilateral Member States 
guarantees.
The funds 
can be 
used for 
loans or 
grants
Art. 352 The flexibility clause of 
the TFEU allows in prin-
ciple the EU to exercise 
new powers consistent 
with the EU’s objectives 
after a proposal from the 
European Commission.
Special legislative procedure: a unani-
mous vote in the Council and the con-
sent of the European Parliament.
Similar to 122, this  can allow use 
of EU budget or creation of an 
ad hoc EU agency with its own 
resources.
Loans 
and/or 
grants
Art. 175 The proposal for a Euro-
pean Investment Stabili-
zation Function was made 
by the Commission in May 
2018 but never concluded.
Article 175(3) allows for the creation of 
an instrument supporting eligible pub-
lic investment in Member States that 
are confronted with a large asymmet-
ric shock with a view to strengthen 
cohesion. 
The proposal envisaged loans 
to Member States from the EU 
are granted on the basis of MFF 
guarantees that would net out 
over time.
Loans 
only
Art. 172, 173 
and 175
EU budget resources used 
in conjunction with the 
EIB to encourage private 
sector lending.
InvestEU is a program to support invest-
ment. It allows the leveraging of modest 
EU budget guarantees to facilitate EIB 
and private sector lending.
The program is an EU budget  
framework programthat  
supports the European Invest-
ment Fund and the European  
Investment Banks.
Guaran-
tees
TABLE 1 – OPTIONS FOR A EUROPEAN RECOVERY FUND BACKED BY THE EU  BUDGET
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Moving the recovery fund out of the 
EU budget
From today’s perspective, it seems 
possible that the recovery fund will 
eventually be detached from the MFF 
so that it can move forward swiftly. 
There are at least two options for 
how the recovery fund could be im-
plemented outside of the MMF (see 
table 2).
CONCLUSION
There are obvious pros and cons to 
both options for raising money for 
the European Recovery Fund. Raising 
funds outside of the EU budget would 
be far more expedient and f lexible, 
whereas doing it inside the EU budget 
would probably set a more important 
precedent and pave the way for further 
expansion down the line. 
This brief overview shows that there 
are several ways for the EU to mobi-
lize more resources in response to the 
corona crisis. Finding the right balance 
will require real political discussions 
and financial commitments. What is 
fundamentally at stake is not only the 
economic response and recovery but 
also the future makeup of Europe-
an financial solidarity and the EU’s fu-
ture autonomy. During the Eurocrisis, 
Member States and in particular Ger-
many safeguarded national controls via 
intergovernmental instruments. This 
time, placing more fiscal resources in 
the hands of the EU budget would be a 
true step forward. However, while it is 
important to determine how these re-
sources are raised, it will be even more 
important to decide how they used. If 
it is merely to lend money to Member 
States, the EU’s economic response 
will not be mutual enough to meet a 
common threat.
Legal Basis Purpose Scope Link to MFF Use of 
funds
Intergov-
ernmental
EU Member States or a 
coalition thereof would 
be free to set up a vehicle 
with appropriate resourc-
es and guarantees. 
Such a vehicle could be enshrined either  
in EU law (along the model of the Single  
Resolution Fund for example) or 
completely outside of the EU legal 
framework.
This intergovernmental arrange-
ment would have no link to the 
MFF.
Member  
States 
would be 
free to  
offer loans 
and/or 
grants
Art. 136 Provides for financial 
assistance specifical-
ly linked to the safeguard 
and financial stability in 
the euro area.
The modification of Art. 136 under the 
simplified revision procedure in 2011 ef-
fectively limited EU powers to the provi-
sion of assistance for euro area stability  
under 122.2 and moved this 
responsibility 
to the ESM. 
No link to the MFF. The ESM has 
its own paid and callable capital. 
Loans only
TABLE 2 – OPTIONS FOR A EUROPEAN RECOVERY FUND OUTSIDE OF THE MFF
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